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TAX REFORM IN THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
IVAN MIKLOS ˇ,M AREK JAKOBY AND
KAROL MORVAY* 
Previous tax systems in Slovakia and their 
imperfections
Economic policy in Slovakia has undergone a few
principal qualitative turns in the course of a 15-year
transition from a centrally-planned economy to a
market economy. The need to adjust the tax system
arose as an accompanying necessary features of such
shifts.Besides dozens of parametrical changes,the tax
system was subject to two cases of fundamental re-
construction. Both were linked to substantial changes
in direction of economic policy. Firstly, the fall of the
socialist economy required the creation of a tax sys-
tem that could be comparable with that in standard
market economies.Secondly,the overcoming of non-
standard and somehow hybrid economic policy after
1998 and consequent upshifting of the reform
process after 2002 called for further fundamental re-
form. An overview of the reform stages is provided
in Box 1.
The tax system at the threshold of the transforma-
tion process corresponded to the needs of an admin-
istratively managed economy. It served as a tool for
direct selection, subsidies and social policy. These
functions were incorporated in the sales tax with nu-
merous rates, which enabled an individual approach
in accordance with the goals of the centrally planned
economy. The sales tax system was marked by indi-
vidual tax rates for each item and was, thus, in fun-
damental contradiction with the principles of mod-
ern market economy.
The system also included several items with negative
sales tax (which in fact represented a subsidy) in or-
der to maintain low prices and ensure affordability
to all citizens. Understandably, the first fundamental
change in the tax system included abolition of the
negative sales tax in 1990.This step resulted in a first
inflation shock (increase in prices of food which had
benefited from the negative sales tax).This increase
was compensated by a special social allowance. The
abolition of the negative sales tax was followed by
price liberalisation which came into force on 1
January 1991.
The timing of the launch of the first fundamental
change of the tax system in January 1993 accidental-
ly coincided with the birth of the Slovak Republic.
The establishment of an independent state,however,
did not have any direct impact on the shape of the
system.The new system incorporated relevant com-
ponents of the tax system in EU countries. Its basic
pillar was a value added tax with two rates, which
were later changed a few times. Personal income tax
was progressive with six income brackets and rates
ranging from 15 to 47 percent. However, the system
also included five other tax rates applied to specific
sources of income. Corporate income tax was set
with linear rate of 45 percent.
Experience has consequently revealed numerous
shortcomings of the system: dozens of legislation
amendments increased its complexity, numerous ex-
ceptions and special regimes clashed with basic taxa-
tion principles.Furthermore,the progressivity of per-
sonal income taxation was increasing in the course of
time: while the tax brackets were kept fixed, rising
wages pushed taxpayers towards higher rates.
Frequent parametrical adjustments to the system
were adopted in response to the needs of public fi-
nances and macroeconomic development. Such ad-
justments were quite common mainly in the course of
a macroeconomic stabilisation operation in
1999–2000 when it was necessary to correct the dise-
quilibrium trends set forth by the non-standard eco-
nomic policy between 1995 and 1998. Typical adjust-
ments included shifting selected commodities from a
reduced to a standard VAT rate and an increase in
excise taxes. On the other hand, statutory corporate
income tax rate was gradually reduced with the goal
to promote economic activity.
The second and the most recent fundamental recon-
struction of the tax system effective from January
2004 required much more political courage than the
previous one because it was no longer copying stan-
dard tax systems of Western Europe but was rather
based on a fundamental change of some taxation
principles. A larger emphasis on competitiveness of
the economy called for a more attractive and moti-
vating tax system.The tax reform, with a flat income
tax rate applying to all sources of income being its
cornerstone, was part of a broader reform package,
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part of the policy aimed at enhancing the competi-
tiveness of the Slovak economy and ensuring its sus-
tainable growth.
Political opposition towards tax reform
The Slovak tax reform was not challenged by oppo-
sition on the part of the public. In fact, people could
assess the impact well in advance and a large group
of winners profiting from the reform was quite clear-
ly visible.The opposition was rather concentrated in
those areas where reforms brought about a tangible
increase in costs alongside possible future benefits
(such as health care reform or an attempt to reform
university education by introducing tuition fees).
The social acceptance of the tax reform required
minimising the group of losers who would not profit
from the reform. A substantial increase in a tax-ex-
empt allowance meant that people with low taxable
income are not required to pay any income tax.
CESifo DICE Report 3/2005 54
Reform Models




Tax system based on socialist economy. Taxes serve
as fiscal and subsidy tool.
Parametrical changes: adjustments of tax rates and 
income brackets.
Removal of the most critical deformation – negative 
sales tax serving as subsidy.
The first complete tax reform inspired by tax  systems
in western Europe. Introduction of VAT, progressive 
personal income taxation and linear taxation of 
corporate profits.
The second complete tax reform: single VAT rate, 
equal taxation of all sources of income by flat tax rate.
Tax system based on socialist economy. Taxes serve
as fiscal and subsidy tool.
Parametrical changes: adjustments of tax rates and 
income brackets.
Removal of the most critical deformation – negative 
sales tax serving as subsidy.
The first complete tax reform inspired by tax  systems
in western Europe. Introduction of VAT, progressive 
personal income taxation and linear taxation of 
corporate profits.
The second complete tax reform: single VAT rate, 





Neoliberal economic policy following the
Washington Consensus. Inevitable reforms to 
keep the newborn market economy running.
A hybrid policy seeking „Slovak path of 
transformation“, postponement of other
reforms, reinforcement of dirigiste methods.
Correction of deformation from the previous
period, renewal of macro-stability, preparation
of complex reforms.
Simultaneous launch of several reforms with
common goal to enhance competitiveness
and ensure sustainable economic growth.
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However, the reform was opposed by left-oriented
political entities (albeit determination of right and
left is quite a problem on the changing Slovak polit-
ical stage).Their opposition accented three points:
1) Abolition of progressivity allegedly eliminated
solidarity.
2) Economic transformation brought sudden and
frequently also a non-transparent, illegal or im-
moral distribution of wealth. Failure of other in-
struments to rectify such wrongful property ac-
quisition had, in the opinion of the opposition,
justified high income taxation of high-income
earners. The opposition even put forward a few
proposals for selective specific taxation regimes
for some industries reporting huge profits
(marked as “inadequate” by some politicians).
3) Abolition of reduced VAT which led to higher
prices for elementary goods, such as food and
medicines, thus negatively affecting mainly low-
income households.
Although largely seen as a right-wing reform, it was
not spared criticism from the right zone of the polit-
ical spectrum.The right-wing critics questioned “too
high tax rates” and the initial absence of the goal to
reduce the overall income redistribution rate in the
economy. A guiding principle of the process of set-
ting up the reform parameters was the principle of
fiscal neutrality, i.e. to collect as much in tax rev-
enues as in a situation without reform.The critics,on
the contrary, assumed that the reform would lead to
a more radical decrease in state budget revenues
that would consequently exert pressure to reduce ex-
penditures.
However,the Ministry of Finance exercised caution in
order to avoid any shocks in the course of implemen-
tation of the reform.Although the government set the
reduction of the public expenditure/GDP ratio as one
of its targets, the idea was not to achieve it by a sud-
den fall in the initial stage of the new system.
Basic philosophy of the tax reform
Avoiding the need to go into specific details, we can
summarise framework principles of the Slovak tax
reform (see also Box 2):
Shift from selectivity to universality.The new tax sys-
tem subjects all kinds of income to equal taxation1.
The system has thus reduced broad range of excep-
tions, special rates or special taxation regimes.
Simplicity and transparency were thus significantly
enhanced.
Enforced incentives to work.The elimination of pro-
gressive income taxation eliminated the disincentive
to “earn more”and weakened the motivation to con-
ceal one’s income. A relatively low income tax rate
combined with the absence of special dividend taxa-
tion stimulates business activity.
Shift from labour and capital taxation to consump-
tion taxation. A reduced direct taxation leaves the
key role to indirect taxes.
As we mentioned above, the tax reform was imple-
mented alongside other reforms. It is therefore use-
ful to point out the complementary effects of differ-
ent reforms:
1) The tax reform is built on the same principles as
the social system and labour market reforms. All
these policies share incentives to activity as com-
mon feature:Tax policy through lower tax burden
on labour income and child tax credit; labour
market and social policies reach the same goal by
more strict control of registered unemployed and
by new social benefit system including work acti-
vation components aimed at long-time unem-
ployed.
2) The tax reform supplements the public adminis-
tration reform. The latter enforces role of self-
governments, which enjoy increasing authority
over generation of their revenues.The process of
fiscal decentralisation included direct allocation
of a given percentage of collected personal in-
come tax to cities and municipalities2. The self-
governments also gained power to set the rates of
real estate taxes. Local authorities can thus ac-
tively shape the business environment in their re-
spective areas. However, most self-governments
used the new power to increase the tax rates dra-
matically in order to solve liquidity problems.
The government occasionally breaks with the ideo-
logical purity of the tax system by a policy aimed at
attracting large foreign investments. Selective provi-
sion of investment incentives including tax abate-
1 Except certain kinds of income which are not subject to income
tax (inheritance, gifts, etc.) and sources of income explicitly tax ex-
empted (pensions from public system, social benefits, income from
the sale of real estate after five years of ownership, state lottery
prizes, interest on Slovak eurobonds, etc.) 
2 Effective from January 2005, 70.3 percent of personal income tax is
allocated directly to municipalities, 23.5 percent is transferred to re-
gional self-governments and 6.2 percent remain in the state budget.ments creates exemptions of the
principles of universality and eq-
uity. However, we consider this
policy, principally motivated by
efforts to reduce still high unem-
ployment, to be of a temporary
nature, without setting up long-
term trends.
Initial effects of the reform 
Personal labour income taxation
The tax reform brought a reduc-
tion in the effective taxation of
personal income as well as of the
tax wedge. This reduction, how-
ever, was minimal in the income
range between 90 and 160 per-
cent of the average wage (Fig-
ure 2). Figure 2 also shows that
there is still some progressivity in
the personal income taxation.Al-
though the marginal income tax
increased for people with taxable
income in the range 60–90 per-
cent of the average (Figure 1),
the overall effect was favourable
due to the introduction of a high
basic tax-exempt allowance. We
have also included 2005 in the comparison in order to
compare the shifts resulting from systemic change
(2004 vs. 2003) with those resulting from changes of
built-in parameters, such as basic tax-exempt al-
lowance (2005 vs. 2004). The taxation curves in 2005
(yellow lines in Figures 1 and 2) are shifted slightly to
the right due to the automatically living-minimum-
indexed tax-exempt allowance.
It is also worth to note the shift in total payroll tax
burden in 2004 (Figure 3). Due to the reduction in
social security contributions paid by employers the
winners included workers in almost the whole spec-
trum of income. However, the introduction of an av-
erage wage-linked maximum assessment base nega-
tively affected taxpayers who had previously paid
contributions from lower assessment base that had
been set as a lump-sum.
The introduction of a flat income tax and related fea-
tures (tax-exempt allowance, tax credit, etc.) thus
meant an increase in net income to the majority of
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Box 2
Basic components of the tax reform
1. Changes  in indirect taxes:
• Amendment to the Acts on Excise Taxes – increase 
of certain excise tax rates: mineral oils, beer and to-
bacco products (August 2003)
• Amendment of VAT Act – unification of  VAT rates 
at 19 percent (before: 20 percent and 14 percent) as
of January 2004.
2. Changes in direct taxes:
• New Income Tax Act – introduction of 19 percent
flat tax (January 2004)
– Basic tax-exempted allowance increased from
lump sum (SKK 38,760 in2003) to 19.2 times
the monthly living minimum (80,732 in 2004)
– The allowance applicable also for non-working
spouse with its proportional reduction linked to
his/her own taxable income
– Substitution of tax-exempt allowance per child
with child tax credit
• New Real Estate Transfer Tax Act – abolitionof gift
and inheritance tax and introduction of 3 percent
flat rate for real estate transfer tax (January 2004);
Abolitionof real estate transfer tax  (January 2005).
3. Changes in indirect taxes in compliance with EU tax
legislation












































































































































MARGINAL EFFECTIVE INCOME TAX RATE (METR)
%
Exchange rate SKK to 1 Euro, 2003: 41.5; 2004: 40.0; 1H 2005: 38.6.
Average wage in 2003 = SKK 14,365.
Corresponding METR was 17.4%
Gross monthly wage (SKK)
Average wage in 2004: SKK 15,825 Sk.











































































































































Exchange rate: see Figure1.
Average wage in 2003 = SKK 14,365.
Corresponding effective income tax rate was 7.7%
Average wage in 2004: SKK 15,825 Sk.
Corresponding effective income tax rate was 8.4%
Gross monthly wage (SKK)
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individual tax payers compared to 2003.As we indi-
cated above, there was a group of taxpayers who ex-
perienced no change in their net income from a sta-
tic point of view.This group consisted mainly of sin-
gle individuals with monthly gross income ranging
from SKK 12,000 to 20,000.
As the income taxation was only one component of
the reform, it is necessary to consider indirect taxes
to calculate the overall effect of the reform on net re-
al income. The effect on two types of households is
presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4 clearly indicates that winners of the tax re-
form from the point of view of impacts of tax
changes on real income included families with chil-
dren including households with non-working spous-
es taking care of children.It is also relevant,that any
further increase in gross taxable income in the future
will bring more in net income to all taxpayers than
before the reform. The motiva-
tion to earn more in legal ways
was thus substantially enhanced.
It is also worth noting that the re-
al consumption of households
grew by 3.5 percent in 2004. Al-
though “distribution” of this
growth by income segments might
show some discrepancies,such ro-
bust growth dispelled the fears of
the effect that the unification of
VAT and increase in excise taxes
might have on consumer prices.
While most of the working popu-
lation was able to absorb the consequent increase in
consumer prices with a higher net income, people
without taxable income were not able cover higher liv-
ing costs with tax allowances3. Pensioners were there-
fore compensated in the form of a lump-sum payment
(rather non-systemic measure) paid in the autumn of
2004. Although we can say that pensioners were the
short-time losers of tax reform, they are now benefit-
ing from the pension reform, which has introduced a
new indexation mechanism that provides space for an
increase in the real purchasing power of pensions.
Capital income taxation
Unlike the case of personal income tax, there are no
special indicators measuring the impact of the tax re-
form on the corporate sector. However, we can still
use some (albeit simplified) parameters.
The Slovak tax reform was, beside other principles,
based on the idea of significant
reduction in capital income. The
practical result of the abolition
of dividend tax was an annual
decrease in the effective taxation
of business income from 36.3 to
19 percent (Table).
The reduction of taxation meant
increased disposable income in
profitable businesses and better
values of return on sales. At the
same time, more companies be-






































































































































Household with non-working spouse on parent allowance and 2 children Single individual
Source: Tax legislation.
OVERALL STATIC EFFECT OF TAX REFORM IN 2004
Change of real net monthly income (SKK)
a) Although the excise taxes on fuels and beer were increased already from August 1, 2003, their adjustment are in fact 
part of the 2004 reform.
Average wage
Gross monthly wage (SKK)
Flat income tax, unification of VAT rates and increase of excise taxes
a)
Figure 4
3 Neither welfare payments nor pensions
from the state-run pension scheme are
taxed in Slovakia.Higher disposable income has enabled more inten-
sive investment activities and was probably one of
the important factors behind the robust growth of
gross fixed capital formation in 2005 (5.8 percent in
constant prices), the highest growth rate since the
last quarter of 2001.
Another useful indicator of perception of the tax re-
form by the corporate sector is the development in
the number of businesses. It is significant that with
the exception of agriculture (specific sector marked
with long-term problematic issues) and the energy
sector (dominated by a few large players), all indus-
tries reported a robust increase in the number of
businesses at the end of 2003 (when the shape of re-
form was widely known) and in 2004 compared with
the previous periods (Figure 5).
Beside lower effective taxation,the business commu-
nity also welcomed a reduction in the depreciation
period of buildings from 30 to 20 years, eliminated
the restrictions of the depreciation rate in the first
year of the depreciation period and liberalised treat-
ment of loss carry-forward. Goliás ˇ and Kic ˇina (2005)
note that private accountants in Slovakia were told
by their clients that they were more concerned about
their ability to write off legitimate losses than wheth-
er statutory corporate income tax rate was 15 or 25
percent. Contrary to the previous system valid until
the end of 2003, loss can now be deducted from the
tax base in the course of five years following the year
when it incurred without even the obligation of write-
offs and without the obligation to reinvest the same
amount in capital goods.
Fiscal implications
Total tax revenues in 2004, the
first year of the new tax system,
were in line with projections of
the Ministry of Finance. The ba-
sic fiscal condition of the tax re-
form – fiscal neutrality – was thus
met. At the same time, however,
some shifts occurred in the struc-
ture of tax revenues. While the
collection of personal as well as
corporate income tax measured
as a share of GDP exceeded the
planned level (possibly as a result
of higher motivation among tax-
payers to report their income as
well as postponement of some
payments from 2003 to 2004),
VAT collection failed to reach
the projected value (Figure 6).
However, the shortfall was prob-
ably at least partially affected by
the entry of Slovakia into the EU
and consequent problems with
the collection of VAT from cross-
border transactions.
A similar development of tax
revenues is also visible in 2005,




Statutory corporate income tax rate 25  19 
Dividend tax  15  0 
Effective taxation of distributed
corporate profit 36,3 19 
  Source: Tax legislation; table: authors.
Figure 5
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with corporate tax being the “frontrunner”. By the
end of June, Slovak business paid SKK 10 billion
(70 percent) more in corporate tax than projected.
Reactions from abroad
The Slovak tax reform has also become a frequently
cited factor enhancing the attractiveness of Slovakia
in the eyes of foreign investors. Although it is diffi-
cult to precisely specify the importance of the new
tax system in the decision-making process of inves-
tors coming to Slovakia, it is quite obvious that the
number of investors considering or already planning
to invest in Slovakia increased in 2004.A hint in this
context can be provided by the number of projects
developed by the state investment agency SARIO.
While the number was 22 in 2003 (with a total value
of projected invested amount USD 1.44 billion), in
2004 the agency reported 47 accomplished projects
worth USD 2.26 billion. However, we assume that
the factors behind this increase are rather complex
and include probably the whole spectrum of busi-
ness-friendly reforms (such as more flexible labour
legislation, more efficient business set up proce-
dures) along with improving the infrastructure and a
favourable labour cost/productivity ratio.
It is also significant,that Slovakia competes with oth-
er countries of the region for large investors offering
generous state aid packages which in most cases also
include partial or full corporate income tax holidays
for up to ten years.
The Slovak tax reform provoked strong reactions
from the foreign business community, and dozens of
companies from the “old”EU member countries de-
clared their intention to move headquarters or even
independent units to “more favourable tax environ-
ments”. While one has to understand such declara-
tions as a highly useful and effective tool to exert
pressure on domestic governments to carry out sim-
ilar reforms, the highly competitive level of corpo-
rate profit taxation and relative simplicity and trans-
parency resulted in a higher number of foreign busi-
nesses being registered in Slovakia.
Some top politicians in countries with traditionally
high income taxation reacted in an irritated manner
accusing Slovakia as well as other “flat-tax coun-
tries” of “tax dumping”. Some of them consequently
questioned the right of these countries to draw from
the EU structural funds.Such argumentation is,how-
ever, built on completely wrong premises.As one of
the strategic goals of similar tax reforms is to boost
the economic growth by a lower tax burden on eco-
nomic activity, their implementation in fact leads to
higher GDP per capita and consequently to more
limited space to offset the handicap of falling behind
the EU average with structural funds.
It is worth noting that the reduction in income taxa-
tion along with the reduction in the tax burden mea-
sured both in relation to labour cost (tax wedge) as
well as to GDP had been a long-term trend in most
OECD countries already from the end of 1990s (Tax
Foundation, 2004).
Still, however, the Slovak reform contributed to
speeding up the process and fuelling the debates on
radical tax reform in many other countries. Goliás ˇ
and Kic ˇina (2005) note that the reform evoked fierce
tax competition among central European countries,
which continued to spread further to the west.They
point at a reduction in the corporate tax rate in
Austria from 34 to 25 percent (while the original
plan was to “stop” at 31 percent), the reduction of
the standard VAT rate in the Czech Republic from
22 to 19 percent in 2004,and the plan to decrease the
corporate tax rate from 28 to 24 percent in 2006 and
reductions in the statutory corporate tax rate in
Poland and Hungary from 27 to 19 percent and from
18 to 16 percent, respectively.
Outlook on further reform steps
Increasing tax competition raises a simple question:
what comes next? Fortunately, Slovak reformers do
not consider the tax reform a one-off issue. It comes
as a matter of course that adjustments are being
made or planned. At the same time, the experts are
considering modifications to some basic components
of the new system. One of the most recent proposals
of the Ministry of Finance is to replace the basic tax-
exempt allowance with a tax credit.Such a step would
lead to a higher net income for low-wage earners and
consequently to higher incentives to create more jobs
for people with lower qualifications. Such people
make up most of the long-term unemployed in Slo-
vakia and the goal to reduce substantially long-term
unemployment presents one of the most important
challenges to economic policy.
While the introduction of tax credit can contribute to
some improvement, policymakers will have to lookclosely at social contributions. Although total labour
costs in Slovakia are still lowest from among the “V4”
countries4,it is obvious that the high contribution bur-
den paid by both employers and employees from the
first koruna of earned income (reaching 36 percent of
total labour cost) effectively hampers the creation of
low-wage jobs. While some improvement was
achieved in 2004 (Figure 7) and a reduction in em-
ployer’s contributions resulted in a moderate reduc-
tion of the tax wedge for low-wage earners (with
monthly wages corresponding to 67 per cent of aver-
age wages in manufacturing), much has to be done in
the entire system of social contributions, with due at-
tention paid to the overall balance of individual com-
ponents.
Despite the proposed adjustments,the modification
of tax rates (income tax,VAT) is not the question of
the day. If, however, public finances develop fa-
vourably (the basic requirement is to keep the gen-
eral government deficit below 3 percent of the
GDP from 2006),toughening tax competition in the
region might exert pressure to further reduce the
flat income tax. There is one negative scenario as
well, though. The strongest opposition party,
SMER,has officially declared a negative attitude to
the flat income tax and declared ambitions to rein-
troduce income tax progressivity to the system.The
next parliamentary election due in September 2006
will provide the answer to the future fate of the
Slovak reform.
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4 V4 – four „Visegrád“ countries – Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia.
Figure 7